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Financial	crises,	corporate	scandals	and	blind	spots:
who	is	responsible?
According	to	the	U.S.	Financial	Crisis	Inquiry	Commission,	the	main	causes	of	the	financial	crisis	of	2007-2009	were
failures	of	corporate	governance	and	policy,	including	widespread	failures	in	financial	regulation	and	supervision,
lack	of	transparency,	poor	preparation	by	the	government,	and	systemic	breakdown	in	accountability.	The
Commission	concluded	that	the	crisis	was	avoidable.
In	their	book	This	Time	is	Different:	Eight	Centuries	of	Financial	Folly,	Reinhart	and	Rogoff	show	that	financial	crises
over	many	years	and	jurisdictions	have	similar	characteristics.	The	authors	suggest	in	conclusion	that	crises	are
preventable	but	that,	since	governments	are	themselves	part	of	the	problem,	the	challenge	of	prevention	is	political:
“Encouragingly,	history	does	point	to	warning	signs	that	policy	makers	can	look	at	to	assess	risk—if	only	they	do	not
become	too	drunk	with	their	credit	bubble-fuelled	success.”
Policymakers’	failures	to	act	on	lessons	of	financial	crises	persist.	Today’s	financial	system	remains	excessively
fragile,	inefficient,	and	dangerous.	Many	rules	are	still	poorly	designed	and	unnecessarily	complex.	Regulation	is
often	inadequate	and	sometimes	counterproductive.	Hundreds	of	billions	paid	by	financial	firms	in	fines	for	fraud	and
other	violations	of	rules	do	not	seem	to	deter	bad	conduct.	The	individuals	in	private	and	government	institutions
whose	actions	and	inaction	cause	harms	suffer	minor	if	any	consequences.
In	a	recent	essay,	I	argue	that	the	problems	in	the	nexus	of	corporate	governance	and	political	economy	are	deep
and	go	well	beyond	the	financial	sector.	Corporations	cause	preventable	distortions	and	harm	through	deception	and
recklessness	largely	because	governments	fail	to	set	and	enforce	proper	rules.	These	important	issues	are	often
ignored	in	economics.
Corporate	finance	textbooks	and	much	of	the	corporate	governance	literature	argue	that	managers	should	create
“shareholder	value,”	which	in	practice	translates	to	a	focus	on	financialised	measures	such	as	stock	price	and
accounting	earnings.	Milton	Friedman	famously	claimed	in	1970	that	the	social	responsibility	of	managers	is	to	“make
as	much	money	as	possible	while	conforming	to	the	basic	rules	of	society.”	This	approach	presumes	that	individuals
and	firms	abide	by	the	rules	and	that,	through	contracts	and	laws,	the	rules	provide	protection	to	stakeholders	and
enable	trust	in	markets	and	society	that	is	essential	for	corporations	to	operate	efficiently.
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These	conditions,	however,	are	often	violated	in	key	ways.	Differences	in	information	and	control	powers	enable
those	with	better	information	and	control	to	benefit	while	harming	others.	Contracts	and	laws	are	imprecise	and	costly
to	enforce.	Reputation	concerns	cannot	fully	neutralise	differences	in	information	and	control	if	responsibility	is
diffuse	and	the	gains	from	misconduct	are	large.	Auditors	or	rating	agencies	are	unlikely	to	uncover	fraud	or	provide
reliable	information	unless	contracts,	laws	and	effective	enforcement	provide	proper	incentives.	It	can	be	difficult
even	for	governments	to	obtain	sufficient	information	to	enforce	rules	on	large	and	opaque	corporations.	Political
economy	frictions	determine	how	well	governments	perform	in	their	role	of	setting	and	implementing	effective	rules
that	enable	markets	and	address	frictions	that	cause	distortions.
Current	governance	practices	encourage	managers	to	lobby	to	obtain	and	maintain	monopoly	rents	and	excessive
subsidies	and	to	shape	the	language	and	enforcement	of	rules.	Beyond	fraud,	managers	and	others	may	also	benefit
from	creating	or	perpetuating	confusion	in	policy	debates.	The	results	can	harm	most	shareholders,	who	may	also
suffer	as	citizens,	employees	or	customers.	In	my	essay	I	discuss	how	regulatory	capture,	enforcement	frictions,	and
cross-jurisdictional	competition	can	cause	policy	failures.
These	and	related	problems	arise	in	many	sectors,	including	energy,	cars,	food,	pharmaceuticals,	and	technology.
Some	of	the	issues	can	also	be	seen	in	the	case	of	Carillion,	a	UK	construction	giant	that	collapsed	recently.	Harmful
conduct	is	often	hidden	and	may	go	undetected	for	extensive	periods	of	time.	Those	who	are	aware	of	such	conduct
may	either	benefit	from	it	or	remain	silent	because	speaking	up	is	personally	costly	or	they	feel	powerless	to	effect
change.	When	corporate	scandals	or	policy	failures	come	to	light,	people	in	positions	or	responsibility	tend	to	deny
harm,	divert	attention	from	their	own	culpability,	and	shift	blame	to	others	or	to	exogenous	factors	out	of	anyone’s
control.	In	reality,	these	individuals	have	often	enabled	or	at	least	implicitly	encouraged	harm	through	their	actions	or
inaction,	and	they	could	have	and	should	have	done	more	to	prevent	it.
The	status	quo,	in	which	governments	—	even	in	well-developed	democracies	—	tolerate	or	exacerbate	corporate
governance	failures	and	in	which	false	and	misleading	narratives	obscure	reality,	is	alarming	and	dangerous.	Beyond
inefficiencies	and	injustice,	it	causes	distrust	in	institutions	and	contributes	to	the	vulnerability	of	public	discourse	to
manipulation	by	demagogues	exploiting	and	diverting	anger	and	fears.	The	main	issue	is	not	the	oft-debated	size	of
government,	but	rather	the	quality,	integrity,	and	effectiveness	of	all	institutions,	especially	those	that	design	and
enforce	the	rules	for	all.
Economists	usually	seem	blind	to	these	issues	and	overlook	them	in	their	analyses.	For	example,	the	vast	majority	of
papers	in	macroeconomics	and	banking	either	take	the	extreme	fragility	of	the	financial	system	as	given,	or	suggest
on	the	basis	of	inadequate	assumptions	that	fragility	is	essential	or	even	beneficial.	They	ignore	key	conflicts	of
interests,	regulatory	failures,	fraud,	and	political	economy	forces	that	are	critical	for	understanding	the	issues	being
analysed,	including	the	behaviour	of	banks,	the	growth	of	the	so-called	shadow	banking	system,	and	the	contagion
mechanisms	that	create	systemic	risk.
Related	policy	discussions	reflect	these	blind	spots.	They	focus	primarily	on	what	to	do	once	sudden	exogenous
“shocks”	have	caused	a	crisis.	The	possibility	that	better	policies	can	address	the	underlying	causes	of	fragility	in
banking,	reduce	the	likelihood	of	financial	crises,	and	improve	the	financial	system’s	ability	to	serve	the	economy
rarely	receives	serious	attention.	In	another	recent	essay	entitled	“It	Takes	a	Village	to	Maintain	a	Dangerous
Financial	System,”	I	discuss	the	many	enablers	of	policy	failures	in	the	financial	sector,	including	economists	and
academics.	Paul	Pfleiderer’s	essay	on	the	misuse	of	models	in	finance	and	economics	offers	many	relevant	insights.
Blindness	to	reality	can	harm,	and	recognising	problems	is	necessary	for	addressing	them.	To	improve	corporate
governance	and	policy,	we	must	identify	instances	where	markets	and	institutions	cause	harm	and	suggest
approaches	to	reduce	the	scope	for	abuses	of	power	in	all	institutions.	We	must	also	challenge	false	or	misleading
claims	and	demand	that	policy	decisions	are	made	on	the	basis	of	sound	analysis	and	in	the	public	interest.
♣♣♣
Notes:
This	blog	post	is	based	on	the	author’s	paper	A	Skeptical	View	of	Financialized	Corporate	Governance,	Journal
of	Economic	Perspectives—Volume	31,	Number	3—Summer	2017—Pages	131-150
The	post	gives	the	views	of	its	authors,	not	the	position	of	LSE	Business	Review	or	the	London	School	of
Economics.
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